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SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES UNDER
THE UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING
AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWSt
GARY N. HORLICK*
Procedures for the application of the United States antidump-
ing and countervailing duty laws are contained in Title I of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (the Act),' and in the implementing
regulations of the International Trade Administration of the De-
partment of Commerce (Commerce) 2 and the International Trade
Commission (Commission).3 Antidumping and countervailing duty
proceedings may be begun either by the filing of a petition by a
private, "interested" party4 or by self-initiation by the administer-
ing authority, Commerce.5 If the investigation is self-initiated,
Commerce must first allow the affected foreign government an op-
portunity for consultation.' In practice, however, virtually all cases
are begun by private petition, in part because Commerce is un-
likely to initiate an investigation where injury must be shown to
t Copyright 1983 by Gary N. Horlick
* B.A., Dartmouth College, 1968; B.A., Cambridge University, 1970; M.A., Cambridge
University, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1973; Diploma in International Law, Cambridge
University, 1980. Mr. Horlick is currently a partner in the law firm of O'Melveny & Meyers
and is a Visiting Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. From June 1981 to June 1983, Mr.
Horlick served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration.
' See Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 150 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
19 U.S.C. (1982)).
' See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353, 355 (1984).
' See id. § 207.
' See 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b) (1982) (initiating countervailing duty proceeding); id. §
1673a(b) (initiating antidumping duty proceeding). An "interested party" may file a petition
with the Secretary of Commerce (Commerce) and the Commission on behalf of a domestic
industry. Id. §§ 1671a(b), 1673a(b). The statute and customs regulations define interested
parties to include: domestic and foreign manufacturers and producers, exporters, importers
and wholesalers of goods, domestic labor unions, trade or business associations, and foreign
governments. See id. § 1677(9); 19 C.F.R. §§ 207.2(h), 353.12(c), 355.7(c) (1984).
' See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.35, 355.23 (1984)
(enumerating procedures for initiation of investigation by Commerce).
6 See Art. 3.1, Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, incorporated by reference into U.S.
law, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 2, 93 Stat. 144, 147 [hereinafter
cited as Subsidies Code]; 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.35(a), 355.25(a) (1984).
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the Commission and no injured party has come forward.
The petition usually must be filed with both Commerce and
the Commission.7 Petitioners should review a draft of the petition
with the Office of Investigations of the Commission and with the
Office of Import Administration in Commerce prior to filing. Oth-
erwise, any defects in the petition will lead to a warning that the
petition will be dismissed if it is not perfected within the period
allowed before initiation.
A decision whether to initiate an investigation must be made
by Commerce within 20 days of receipt of the petition.8 Commerce
has little leeway to refuse to investigate an allegation that a given
foreign government practice is a subsidy or that dumping is occur-
ring, as long as the claim is supported by some evidence. 9 Thus, if
alleging a subsidy, the petitioner should cite and attach a copy of
the foreign law or regulation under which the alleged subsidy is
paid.
In most instances, the Commission has 45 days from the date
of the filing of a petition or of self-initiation to determine "whether
there is a reasonable indication that. . . an industry in the United
States . . .is materially injured, or. . .is threatened with material
injury. . . ."0 The Commission's determination follows a staff in-
7 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b)(2), 1673a(b)(2) (1982). The petitioner must file his petition
with Commerce and the Commission on the same day. Id. Although Commerce may provide
forms for such petitions, petitioners are not required to use forms. 19 C.F.R. §§
353.36(a)(15), 355.26(a)(14) (1984). For a detailed list of what a petition should contain see
id. § 353.36(a)(1)-(15) (antidumping petition); id. § 355.26(a)(1)-(14) (countervailing duty
petition).
8 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)(2), 1673a(c)(2) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.37(a), 355.27(a)
(1984). If Commerce affirms the sufficiency of the petition, the agency files a notice in the
Federal Register and initiates the investigation. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)(2), 1673a(c)(2)
(1982). If Commerce determines that the petition is insufficient, it must give the petitioner a
written notice of termination articulating the reasons for its decision and must publish a
notice of termination in the Federal Register. See id. §§ 1671a(c)(3), 1673a(c)(3).
' See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c), 1673a(c) (investigation initiated if petition "contains infor-
mation reasonably available to the petitioner supporting the allegations"); S. REP. No. 249,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 449 (unless
Commerce is convinced supporting information fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, it is obliged to investigate); see also United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563,
1568-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (standards for acceptable petitions in antidumping proceedings).
'0 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a)(1), 673b(a)(a) (1982). The Act defines "material injury" as
"harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." Id. § 1677(7). The cus-
toms duties regulations sharpen this definition and list factors for the Commission to con-
sider in determining material injury. 19 C.F.R. § 207.26 (1984). The factors subject to con-
sideration are the volume of imports that are under investigation, the impact of the imports
on prices, and the impact of the imports on domestic procedures of similar merchandise. Id.
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vestigation and, usually, a conference. The conference is, in effect,
a hearing before the Commission's Director of Operations or Inves-
tigations. The petitioner's counsel will want to be fully prepared
for this prior to filing a petition. At that time, a copy of the Com-
mission's questionnaire should be obtained and filled out, possible
problem areas should be thought over, and briefs should be
planned. Conversely, the respondent's counsel typically has very
little warning of the filing of the petition and must review with his
client and the experts possible weaknesses in the petitioning indus-
try's case, as well as consult with the Commission staff to make
sure that the right questions are asked of the petitioning industry.
If the Commission does not find a reasonable indication of in-
jury to a United States industry, the investigation is terminated as
to both the Commission and Commerce." Although in theory there
is no rule against refiling a petition with new evidence, in practice
it would be unwise absent a major change in the facts or the law. If
the Commission finds a reasonable indication of injury, the investi-
gation continues at Commerce,' 2 which probably already has sent
out questionnaires and started gathering information.
The sending of a questionnaire by Commerce to the foreign
government and the companies is the first step in a formal investi-
gation. The petitioner's counsel should make sure that the appro-
priate questions are asked before the questionnaire is sent, since a
later, supplementary questionnaire can lead to delays in the case.
A response to the questionnaire is required within 30 days of re-
ceipt of the questionnaire. Extensions of time for the response are
possible if appropriate. In requesting an extension of time for an-
No particular enumerated factor, however, is dispositive of material injury. See Atlantic
Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 916, 922 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981). See generally 1 P.
FELLER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE § 17.04, at 17-11 to 15 (1983) (dis-
cussing material injury requirement); 1 R. STURM, CUSTOMS LAW AND ADMINISTRATION BOOK-
LET 25, § 58.6, at 35-42 (1984) (same).
Some countervailing duty cases, however, do not require proof of injury to domestic
industry. In countervailing duty cases involving countries that are not signatories to the
Subsidies Code, supra note 6, and that have not assumed substantially equivalent obliga-
tions, no injury test is made available except in certain cases involving non-dutiable mer-
chandise. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1671 (1982). An injury test is required in proceedings involving
goods exported from the European Economic Community and the following countries: Aus-
tria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Finland, Honduras, Japan, Liberia, Nepal, Norway,
North Yemen, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
See 1 P. FELLER, supra, § 17.04[1], at 17-12.
" See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a), 1673b(a) (1982).
12 See id. §§ 1671b(b), 1673b(b).
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swering the questionnaire, the respondent must show evidence of
cooperation, together with good reason why 30 days are insuffi-
cient. The questionnaire response is the respondent's opportunity
to shape its case in the way most advantageous to it, 3 subject to
verification of any information contained therein. 14 Once the ques-
tionnaire response is received, the petitioner should set to work
immediately to analyze it as quickly and thoroughly as possible to
alert Commerce to any sins of omission or commission.
Verification of the questionnaire response normally will be
conducted by a Commerce case analyst, possibly with help from
people within the Import Administration or from outside account-
ants under contract to Commerce. The case analyst in a verifica-
tion is basically checking to determine whether the responses are
supported by hard evidence. Commerce takes the position that a
verification may be made on the basis of a random selection of
data. 5 In theory, a verification should be very simple: the respon-
dent, in putting together the questionnaire response, should have
assembled the "paper trail" leading to each item in the response.
Respondents should not waste their time arguing that a response is
the word of a foreign government and therefore beyond reproach.
Access to confidential information under a protective order is
available to both sides in a proceeding.' 6 In theory, the required
" The respondent's answers to the questionnaire should be carefully framed because
the completed questionnaire becomes part of the record of the proceedings. See 19 C.F.R. §
207.2(i)(1) (1984).
" See 19 C.F.R. § 207.4(b) (1984) (Commerce may exercise discretion to audit or verify
completed questionnaire); see also infra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Com-
merce's methods of verification).
11 See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.51, 355.39 (1984). But see 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (1982) (Commerce
statutorily required to verify all information used to make its determination unless peti-
tioner waives verification).
16 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.30, 355.20 (1984). Information is consid-
ered confidential if it is designated as confidential by the party submitting it to Commerce,
19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b) (1982), and Commerce agrees that it warrants confidential treatment,
see 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.28, 355.18 (1984). To determine whether material is confidential, Com-
merce considers, inter alia, whether the submitting party will suffer adverse effects, includ-
ing substantial harm to its competitive position, if the material is disclosed. See 19 C.F.R.
§§ 353.29, 355.19 (1984).
Disclosure of confidential material is closely regulated. See id. §§ 353.30, 355.20 (1984).
The party requesting disclosure must describe the requested information with particularity
and must articulate reasons for the release of the information. Id. §§ 353.30(a)(1)(i), (iii),
355.20(a)(1)(i), (iii). These procedural requirements must be complied with strictly. See
Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1020, 1025 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1982). In making its determination as to whether such confidential information
should be disclosed, Commerce must "weigh whether the need of the person requesting the
1984]
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non-confidential summary17 should be sufficient in most counter-
vailing duty cases, but in practice the petitioner's counsel will want
to see the confidential responses to the questions. The petitioner's
counsel usually should seek the confidential numbers in an an-
tidumping response in order to doublecheck the calculations and
claims of the respondent. The petitioner should request access to
confidential information as soon as it is received by Commerce, but
it is doubtful that access will be granted immediately, since Com-
merce may only release information pursuant to a carefully rea-
soned decision."i This may create great time pressure for petition-
ers seeking to analyze information, especially during the short time
period allotted for antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations.
One of the few procedural distinctions between countervailing
duty and antidumping cases is the time limit for preliminary de-
terminations. In countervailing duty cases, an extension of time
beyond the "normal" 85 day limit for preliminary determinations 9
may be obtained for as much as an additional 65 days if the case is
novel, complex, or involves a large number of responding compa-
nies.20 In practice, most countervailing duty investigations are ex-
tended, so the petitioner's counsel should expect a longer period
before the preliminary determination. The "normal" time limit for
an antidumping investigation is 160 days,2' subject to a potential
information outweighs the need of the person submitting it for continued confidential treat-
ment." 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.30(a)(3), 355.20(a)(3) (1984). The protective order under which in-
formation is made available requires the receiving party to sign a sworn statement affirming
that he will not divulge any of the information received, nor use the information for any
other purpose except for that proceeding. See id. §§ 353.30(b), 355.20(b). If the person who
has submitted the confidential information does not want the information revealed, even
under a protective order, the information shall not be released to the requesting party, nor
will it be considered by Commerce when it makes its determination. See id. §§ 353.30(a)(4),
355.20(a)(4). Certain confidential information, such as that made confidential pursuant to
statute or Executive Order, will not be divulged even under a protective order. See id. §§
353.31, 355.21.
17 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(4) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.28(a)(1)-(3), 355.18(a)(1)-(3) (1984).
A "nonconfidential summary" must be provided by the submitting party when a request has
been made to give confidential treatment to the submitted information, unless the party
provides a statement that the information cannot be so summarized and includes the reason
why such summation is not possible. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(4) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§
353.28(a)(1)-(3), 355.18(a)(1)-(3) (1984).
"I See Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1020,
1025 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
'9 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671b (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 355.28(b) (1984).
20 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(c)(1) (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 355.28(b) (1984).
21 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1) (1982).
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extension of up to 210 days if the statutory criteria of novelty,
complexity, or number of firms involved are met.2
An affirmative preliminary determination will lead to the sus-
pension of the liquidation of duties and posting of bonds for the
imported merchandise under investigation, effective on the date of
publication of the preliminary determination in the Federal Regis-
ter.23 In addition, an affirmative preliminary determination by
Commerce will trigger a 120 day period within which the Commis-
sion must make its final injury determination.24 Moreover, in cer-
tain specified circumstances, Commerce can order that the with-
holding of appraisement be made retroactive for up to 90 days to
prevent importers from rushing in merchandise known to be
dumped or subsidized prior to the preliminary determination.25 A
negative preliminary determination will lead to a continuation of
the investigation, with neither a suspension of liquidation nor a
requirement that a bond be posted.26
The preliminary determination is Commerce's presentation of
its policy decisions on issues raised in the investigation. This pres-
entation clarifies the issues of the case and affords all parties an
opportunity to develop their respective strategies. The preliminary
determination is followed closely by a disclosure conference at
which each party is told separately the details of the calculations
leading to the preliminary determination. The purpose of the dis-
closure conference is to give the parties the detailed knowledge
which will enable them to participate effectively in the remainder
of the investigation. It is not a good idea to use the disclosure con-
ference to argue with the staff about the results. That is done at a
hearing, which may be requested by either party before the final
22 See id. § 1673b(c)(1).
See id. 0§ 1671b(d)(1)-(2), 1673d(d)(1)-(2).
2 See id. 0§ 1671d(b)(2), 1673d(b)(2).
22 See id. Suspension of liquidation can be made retroactive when there is a reasonable
basis to believe that critical circumstances are present. See id. §§ 1671b(e)(2), 1673b(e)(2).
Critical circumstances in countervailing duty cases are created where a subsidy is inconsis-
tent with the Subsidies Code, supra note 6, and there have been substantial imports of the
affected merchandise over a short period of time, see 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(e)(1) (1982). Simi-
larly, critical circumstances in antidumping cases involve situations where there has been a
sudden influx of imports of the merchandise and either a history of dumping of such mer-
chandise or circumstances indicating that the importer knew or should have known that the
merchandise was sold at less than fair market value. See id. § 1673b(e)(2).
28 Cf. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(1)(B), 1673d(c)(1)(B) (1982) (suspension of liquidation and
posting of cash deposit required where Commerce issued negative preliminary determina-
tion but made affirmative final determination).
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determination.27 The hearing also serves the function of getting
one's arguments on the record for purposes of possible judicial re-
view.2 During the period between the preliminary determination
and the final determination, all parties will be making their best
arguments on questions of fact, law, and policy. Because of the
time constraints, the ultimate decisionmakers will only have time
for the most concise briefs.
Commerce must make a final determination as to the exis-
tence of a subsidy within 75 days of a preliminary determination in
a countervailing duty case.2 9 Similarly, Commerce must reach a
final determination of whether the merchandise is being sold at
less than fair market value within 75 days, extendable by 135 days
at the request of the party "losing" the preliminary determination,
in an antidumping case.' 0 If the final determination is negative, the
investigation is terminated."' If the final determination is affirma-
tive, the case is sent to the Commission for a final determination of
the existence of material injury.32 At this time the Commission
may require cash deposits if the Commission's preliminary deter-
mination had been negative.3
In general, the Commission must make a final determination
of injury between 45 and 75 days after a final affirmative determi-
nation of dumping or subsidization by Commerce,34 except in those
countervailing duty cases in which no injury test applies.' 5 This
process involves a full-fledged hearing before the Commission, pre-
hearing and post-hearing briefs, and testimony by expert economic
and technical witnesses, all within a very short time. If the Com-
mission's final determination is negative, the investigation is termi-
nated.36 If the final determination is affirmative, Commerce must
217 See id. § 1677c.
28 See id. § 1516a(b)(2)(A) (record for judicial review consists of all information pre-
sented to agencies, including transcripts or records of hearings).
19 See id. § 1671d(a)(1).
20 Id. § 1673d(a)(1)-(2).
31 See id. §§ 1671d(c)(2), 1673d(c)(2). In addition to the termination of the investiga-
tion, the Commission will also "release any bond or other security, and refund any cash
deposit" that had been required. See id. §§ 1671d(c)(2)(B), 1673d(c)(2)(B).
32 See id. §§ 1671d(b)(2)-(3), 1673d(b)(2)-(3).
33 See id. §§ 1671d(c)(1), 1673d(c)(1). It should be noted that cash deposits are more
harmful to the exporter than bonds, since cash deposits tie up his working capital.
34 See id. §§ 1671d(b)(2)-(3), 1673d(b)(2)-(3).
20 See supra note 10.
36 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(3), 1673d(c)(3) (1982).
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issue an antidumping or countervailing duty order.3"
Judicial review may be sought by a party for almost any deci-
sion in an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation, start-
ing with the initiation of the investigation. 8 In practice, the ability
to obtain interlocutory review may tend to favor the government
and large law firms, since a small firm is stretched thin handling
the other aspects of the investigation. Nevertheless, interlocutory
review of procedural matters often makes more sense than an in-
terlocutory challenge to the substance of a preliminary determina-
tion, for the latter will probably be made moot by the final
determination.
Commerce also conducts an annual review of antidumping or
countervailing duty orders. Pursuant to section 751 of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 (section 751),39 such review proceeds in
much the same manner as the original investigation.4 ° The annual
review presents a chance to raise new facts, including those that
may have been missed in the initial investigation, and, to a lesser
extent, a chance to reargue the original points, although at some
risk of irritating the staff.41 Although Commerce, under section
751(c), may revoke an order for changed circumstances,42 Com-
merce has so far refused to use section 751 as a vehicle for revising
recently issued orders.
Settlement of cases may be obtained either by termination or
by suspension agreements. Commerce may terminate an investiga-
tion upon withdrawal of the petition by the petitioner. 4 For pur-
poses of termination, Commerce defines as petitioners only those
parties filing sufficient petitions prior to the initiation of the inves-
.7 Id. §§ 1671d(2), 1673d(2).
11 See id. § 1516a(a)(2). An action to review a determination must be commenced
within 30 days after publication of the determination in the Federal Register. Id. §
1516a(a)(2)(A). Interlocutory determinations are reviewable under an "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard. See id. § 1516a(b)(1)(A). The standard of review for final determinations,
however, is whether the determination is "unsupported by substantial evidence on the rec-
ord .... ." Id. § 1516a(b)(1)(B).
11 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 175 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1982)).
'0 See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.53(b)(1), 355.41(b)(1) (1984). A review will not be commenced
within 24 months after the date of notice of the determination, unless good cause is shown.
See id. Commerce will accept written comments on proposed revisions at any time, but will
not review such comments until 90 days before the redetermination, unless changed circum-
stances are alleged. See id.
4 See id. §§ 353.53(c)-(d), 355.41(c)-(d).
42 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 751(c), 93 Stat. 144, 176 (codi-
fied at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (1982)).
" See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(a), 1673c(a) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.41(a), 355.30(a) (1984).
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tigation. 4 Parties filing only statements of support or filing peti-
tions after the initiation of the investigation are not regarded as
petitioners. The 1982 antidumping and countervailing duty cases
involving certain European Economic Community steel producers
were settled by such withdrawal of petitions.45
Cases also may be settled by suspension agreements.46 There
are three useful types of suspension agreements for countervailing
duty cases: (1) renunciation of the subsidy by the foreign govern-
ment or recipient company,41 (2) imposition of an export tax equal
to the amount of the subsidy,48 and (3) quantitative restraints.49
The other possible statutory suspension agreement, cessation of
exports, 50 has yet to prove useful. Antidumping investigations may
be suspended upon an agreement by the exporters to revise their
prices to a level that completely eliminates any dumping margin. 1
The other type of suspension agreement in antidumping cases, ces-
" See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.41, 355.30 (1984).
" See Certain Steel Products from Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, Termination of Counter-
vailing Duty and Antidumping Investigations, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,058 (1984). In January, 1982,
United States Steel Corp., Bethlehem Steel Corp., Republic Steel Corp., Inland Steel Co.,
Jones and Laughlin Steel, Inc., National Corp., and Cyclops Corp. filed petitions on behalf
of the United States steel industry, alleging that subsidies were being provided directly or
indirectly to the manufacturers, producers, or exporters of steel in certain member states of
the European Economic Community (EEC). Id. Antidumping petitions were also filed by
U.S. Steel Corp. and Bethlehem Steel Corp. in January, 1982, on behalf of the United States
steel industry against the same members of the EEC. Id. at 49,059. In October, 1982, the
petitions were withdrawn pursuant to an agreement between the petitioners and the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Id. at 49,060-61. The objective of the arrangement
was to give the ECSC time to restructure its steel industry and to create a period of trade
stability. Id. at 49,061. As consideration for this arrangement, the ECSC agreed to restrict
exports to, or destined for consumption in, the United States. Id. Because of the withdrawal
of the petitions, Commerce terminated the investigation. Id.
" See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(b)-(f), 1673c(b)-(f) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.42(a)-(k),
355.31(a)-(k) (1984).
" 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(b)(1) (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(a)(1) (1984). For an illustration of
this type of suspension agreement, see Prestressed Concrete Steel Wire Strand from South
Africa, Suspension of Investigation, 47 Fed. Reg. 22,173 (1984). Commerce may not accept
such an agreement unless the agreement would eliminate at least 85% of the subsidy. 19
U.S.C. § 1671(c)(2)(B) (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(b)(2)(ii) (1984).
48 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(b)(1) (1982); see 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(a)(1) (1934). For an example of
a suspension agreement involving the imposition of an export tax, see Tool Steel from Bra-
zil, Suspension of Investigation, 48 Fed. Reg. 11,731 (1983).
" 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)(3) (1982); see 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(b)(3) (1984). This type of sus-
pension agreement has yet to be employed.
50 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(b)(2); see 19 C.F.R. § 355.31(a)(2).
19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b)(1); see 19 C.F.R. § 353.42(a)(1).
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sation of exports,52 is rarely practicable.
The procedures for a suspension agreement are complex. Es-
sentially, the agreement between Commerce and the respondent
must be finalized 30 days prior to the date of the final determina-
tion to allow the domestic petitioner its statutory right of com-
ment.53 The investigation will be continued if Commerce receives a
request to continue the investigation from either the foreign gov-
ernment or an "interested party" within 20 days after the publica-
tion of notice of inspection.54 The petitioner may also compel the
Commission to reinvestigate by petitioning Commerce within 20
days after suspension of the investigation. 5 Finally, a dissatisfied
party may seek judicial review of any suspension agreement.56
r 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b)(2); see 19 C.F.R. § 353.42(a).
53 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(e)(1), 1673c(e)(1) (1982); see 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.42(i), 355.31(i)
(1984).
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(g), 1673c(g) (1982); see 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.43(1), 355.31(1) (1984).
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(h)(i)(2), 1673c(h)(i)(2) (1982); see 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.42(k),
355.31(k) (1984). The Commission has 75 days to act upon the petition seeking reimple-
mentation of the investigation. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671c(h)(2), 1673(h)(2) (1982). If the alleged
injurious acts by the foreign trader or government have not been completely eliminated by
the suspension agreement, the investigation must be resumed. Id. Upon a finding that the
problems that gave rise to the investigation have been cured, any suspension of liquidation
will be terminated, all estimated antidumping or countervailing duties refunded, and all
bonds or other securities released. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.43(1), 355.31(1) (1984).
1, 19 U.S.C. 1616a(a)(2)(B)(iv) (1982). An action to review a suspension agreement
must be commenced within 30 days after publication of the agreement in the Federal Regis-
ter, and the complaint must be issued within 30 days after the action is commenced. Id. §
1516a(a)(2)(A).
